Lawrence Becker briefly considered three distinct problem areas in a modern moral philosophy that argues for an impersonal perspective detached from “self-interest, privileged personal relationships, the demands of the moment, and a … first person point of view” (698.) The … Read More

In “Friedman on Impartiality and Practicality,” Howard McGary responded to a few of Friedman’s points on the impracticality of impartiality.  He responded briefly in three points. In his first point, McGary challenges one of Friedman’s reading of an impartialist position, … Read More

In her article “The Impracticality of Impartiality,” Marilyn Friedman challenged those who advocate that for moral evaluation one should “achieve an unbiased, or impartial, standpoint” (645.)  Her view is that there are no independent criteria by which one may know … Read More

In “Practice of Partiality,” Friedman wrote in three sections; this is a comment on the second, entitled “Partiality and Inadequate Resources.” In this section Friedman engages the impact of partial relationships in social environments of high resource inequality.  Social norms … Read More

In “Practice of Partiality,” Friedman wrote in three sections; this is a comment on the first. In the first section, Friedman pointed out that partial relationships vary in their moral worth: “The quality of a particular relationship is profoundly important … Read More

My response to the Kohlberg / Gilligan debate has different aspects, and a few preceding posts reflect different phases of reflection.  The core issue I was trying to draw out is that universal principles about partial relationships, such as friends … Read More

In a 1988 paper, Lawrence Blum contrasted the moral theories of Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing in support of Gilligan. Kohlberg represents the dominant view, which casts morality as based on “impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principal” … Read More

In a 1988 paper “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,” Lawrence Blum contrasted the moral theories of Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing in support of Gilligan. Kohlberg represents the dominant view, which casts morality as based on “impartiality, … Read More

In a 1988 paper, “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,” Lawrence Blum contrasted the moral theories of Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing in support of Gilligan. Kohlberg represents the dominant view, which casts morality as based on “impartiality, … Read More

Reading the SEP entry on impartiality, I became curious where Ludwig von Mises’ thought might fit within that spectrum.  In Liberalism, Mises locates his thought as consequentialist: “Everything that serves to preserve the social order is moral; everything that is … Read More