riflessioni
In a 1988 paper, Lawrence Blum contrasted the moral theories of Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing in support of Gilligan. Kohlberg represents the dominant view, which casts morality as based on “impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principal” … Read More
In a 1988 paper “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,” Lawrence Blum contrasted the moral theories of Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing in support of Gilligan. Kohlberg represents the dominant view, which casts morality as based on “impartiality, … Read More
In a 1988 paper, “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,” Lawrence Blum contrasted the moral theories of Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg, arguing in support of Gilligan. Kohlberg represents the dominant view, which casts morality as based on “impartiality, … Read More
Reading the SEP entry on impartiality, I became curious where Ludwig von Mises’ thought might fit within that spectrum. In Liberalism, Mises locates his thought as consequentialist: “Everything that serves to preserve the social order is moral; everything that is … Read More
In ch. 5 of Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill argues to ground justice in utility. For Mill, the essence of justice is a “right residing in an individual” (59.) To possess a right is to have a valid claim on society … Read More
I recently came across an interesting presentation on the Canal Académie by Jean-Pierre Dupuy entitled La France et le marché : les sources philosophiques d’une incompatibilité d’humeur. The site is normally only accessible by subscription, but as of this writing the … Read More
I conclude that justice as rights, grounded in the inherent worth of ourselves and others because of the sorts of beings we are, could radically alter our understanding of rights and obligations, and consequently our understanding of political freedom.
In “Justice: rights and wrongs” Nicholas Wolterstorff argues extensively for a conception of justice as rights, in difference with the prevailing theory of justice as right order, with significant import for political freedom.
In chapter one of “Justice and Love” Nicholas Wolterstorff introduces his proposed ethical view of agapism, comparing it with the three macro systems of ethical thought: egoism, eudaimonism, and utilitarianism. I find his critiques conclusive against egoism and utilitarianism; his critique against eudaimonism seems less persuasive. To be clear, on the whole I do not differ with his argument, but it seems to me that his argument against eudaimonism does not preclude two possible objections.
I recently read an article about a new Swedish based religion dedicated to freely copying “digital information,” regardless of copyright, patent, or other intellectual property protection. Underlying that though are interesting aspects of how we think about digital data in contrast to other more traditional information forms.